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Abstract—The U.S Government has been the target for cyber-
attacks from all over the world. Just recently, former President
Obama accused the Russian government of the leaking emails to
Wikileaks and declared that the U.S. might be forced to respond.
While Russia denied involvement, it is clear that the U.S. has to
take some defensive measures to protect its data infrastructure.
Insider threats have been the cause of other sensitive information
leaks too, including the infamous Edward Snowden incident.
Most of the recent leaks were in the form of text. Due to
the nature of text data, security classifications are assigned
manually. In an adversarial environment, insiders can leak
texts through E-mail, printers, or any untrusted channels. The
optimal defense is to automatically detect the unstructured text
security class and enforce the appropriate protection mechanism
without degrading services or daily tasks. Unfortunately, existing
Data Leak Prevention (DLP) systems are not well suited for
detecting unstructured texts. In this paper, we compare two
recent approaches in the literature for text security classification,
evaluating them on actual sensitive text data from the WikiLeaks
dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The sensitivity of information can be assessed based on
the impact that might result from its leakage. From an in-
ternational relations perspective, sensitive information leaks
could damage relationships between the U.S. and its allies,
as resulted from the 2011 leakage of diplomatic cables by
Wikileaks and the 2013 Edward Snowden Leaks. From a
political perspective, sensitive data leaks can create scandals,
sway elections, and end careers, as we saw with the 2016
DNC Email Leaks and the 2016 Panama Papers. While these
scandals have certainly garnered widespread media attention,
and have been hotly debated in the mainstream media, with
some calling for the incarceration of Julian Assange and
Edward Snowden, and others treating these individuals as
sympathetic figures. Regardless of one’s own political opinions
on these respective incidents, however, the magnitude at which
such leaks affect change and the degree of press coverage
that they achieve – with little barrier to entry – means that
they pose an enormous opportunity for bad actors interested
Fig. 1: A prototypical Data Leak Prevention (DLP) framework: Data
can be discovered either through scanning end points for unlabeled
data or capturing data in transit to untrusted channels. Data is then
inspected by the detection module to determine its sensitivity level.
Data that is deemed non-sensitive is normally passed to untrusted
channels and non-sensitive data at rest is marked as non-sensitive.
Detected sensitive data is passed to a protection module. [1].
in negatively impacting the national security, the finances of
institutions, and human lives.
The aforementioned incidents also have a troubling com-
monality: namely, they were perpetrated by insiders. While
data leaks can be perpetrated by both external parties and
insiders, insiders are particularly problematic, since they have
seemingly legitimate access to sensitive data. This renders
them immune to preemption by conventional cybersecurity
safeguards like firewalls and other access control mechanisms.
Moreover, data leaks by insiders are not necessarily malicious
– they can also occur as a result of human error, so even
perfect security vetting cannot prevent all insider-based leaks.
While characteristics of recent data leaks and the threats
posed by insiders can be recounted at great length, little else
needs to be said to convey the demand for effective data
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leak prevention (DLP) systems. Commercial DLP has received
some attention lately, e.g., [2], [3], due to the increasing
number of leaks, and there are four broad components to
an effective commercial DLP system: discovery of what data
might be vulnerable to leakage, detecting senesitive data
and annotating it, protecting the annotated data, and finally
monitoring it (cf. Fig. 1). To date, much work has been devoted
to tracking and securing annotated text, but little work has been
devoted to raw detection of sensitive text. That is the direction
that we pursue in this paper.
Particularly, we build prior work in which we were the first
to perform evaluation on actual sensitive text data acquired
from the Wikileaks dataset. In these works, we introduced
two different techniques – one based on local learning of
classifiers across clusters and a second which, along similar
intuition, uses topic models to prune the training set. While
we compared these results to baseline machine learning algo-
rithms, e.g., SVMs, Naive Bayes, and Logistic Regression, and
achieved statistically superior results, the experimental proto-
cols were heterogeneous, and to maintain scope of each paper,
we did not provide a comparison of our two novel approaches.
In this paper, we compare both approaches under one unified
evaluation protocol. We show that the method of doing local
learning on clusters outperforms the dataset pruning method,
which in turn outperforms all baseline classifiers.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of sensitive text classification is a sub-problem
of natural language processing (NLP) and machine learn-
ing. The simplest methods consist of matching keywords
or phrases. Additional NLP pre-processing techniques like
stemming and stop-word removal can be applied to enhance
accuracy. More sophisticated NLP rules, like regular expres-
sions and context-free grammars [4] can also be applied stan-
dalone or in conjunction with keyword/phrase match. While
keywords offer high recall, they also offer lower precision
than such rule-based approaches. Rule-based approaches can
be used to enhance precision, although rule-based approaches
alone tend to result in diminished recall, since matching a
keyword is a less exacting constraint than matching NLP
rules. A shortcoming of pure NLP rule-based approaches like
formal grammars and regular expressions, however, is that
they are limited in the manner that they generalize to novel
data types. This is the motivation for employing machine
learning algorithms, which, based on training samples, attempt
to parameterize a decision boundary with which to make
hypotheses about query samples. We pursue machine learning
approaches in this paper, particularly feature space models,
in which a text sample is transformed into a vectorized
representation and a hypothesis function, parameterized over
the training set, is used to make the classification decision.
State space models[5], which analyze state transition based
on sequences of input data, and give an output classification
similarity/dissimilarity over the sequence of state transitions
are another approach, but we do not examine them in this
work. NLP rule-based approaches and machine learning each
have their own respective advantages and disadvantages, and
a commercially viable solution would likely consist of some
combination thereof.
We are not the first to explore applying machine learning
toward sensitive text classification. However, previous authors,
e.g., [6], [7], [8], have discussed the problem and proposed
solutions for approaching it. Unfortunately, real sensitive text
datasets are generally kept private, so these works were not
able to perform realistic evaluations, instead using fictitious
“sensitive” texts (e.g., collected from public Twitter feeds).
To perform a more realistic evaluation of the problem, we
introduced the first public sensitive text dataset in [1], con-
sisting of diplomatic cables made public by the WikiLeaks
organization, and performed evaluations using a novel system
design – Automated Classification Enabled by Security Simi-
larity (ACESS) – which performs local classifier learning over
clusters of similarity groups. This work, while seminal, had
the disadvantage that the protocol was inherently expensive
to tune hyperparameters over and had no separate validation
set. We later introduced a different approach and a novel
partitioning of our Wikileaks dataset in [9]. This approach
uses topic modeling, assesses topic purity, and prunes impure
topics from the training set. Like ACESS, it achieves state-
of-the-art performance on the Wikileaks dataset over baseline
classifiers. In this paper, we compare ACESS with our pruning
approach.
III. TEXT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION : DOCUMENT VS.
PARAGRAPH
In this section, we define text security classification
and illustrate the difference between paragraph-based and
document-based based security classification. While sensitivity
level could be assessed at even lower granularity, doing so
would be analogous, e.g., at the sentence level vs. paragraph
level. The important point is that in reality, for many doc-
uments deemed “sensitive”, only a fraction of their text –
sometimes a tiny fraction – is actually sensitive.
A. Feature Set
Unlike regular text classification, few infrequent features
can change the whole document class to a higher security
level. Features extracted from the document level differ from
features extracted from the paragraph level. Security classi-
fication is defined as follows. Each document Di has one
or n informative sections or simply paragraphs P , Di =
{P1, . . . , Pn}. Paragraphs consist of multiple terms or features
F . In document-based classification, one feature set is derived
for all the paragraphs, this features set determines the docu-
ment security class DClassi = {P1, . . . , Pn} = (F1, . . . , Fn).
The downside of document-based approach is the assump-
tion that all document portions belong to the same security
class which is unlikely. Consequently, the document feature
set will accommodate irrelevant features assigned to the
document class. Predicting the document class in document-
based classification is straightforward compared to paragraph-
based. In paragraph-based classification, a document consists
of paragraphs with one or more different security classes. In
order to avoid inconsistency, the security classes described in
this section match the classes that appeared in the dataset used
in our experiments. The security classes are Unclassified, Con-
fidential and Secret which is defined respectively as follows
Class = {U,C, S}. Let C(P ) be the operator that returns the
classification of paragraph P .
The class set sorts the security classes from the lowest
security level as the first member in the set to the high-
est. In paragraph-based security classification, a document
has multiple feature sets, one set for each paragraph within
the document. The security of the paragraph is determined
based on its extracted features Di = C(Pi), . . . , C(Pn)} =
{M(f1,1, . . . , f1,m), . . . ,M(fn,1, . . . , fn,m)}, where M is the
machine that estimates the class, m is number of features in
each paragraph and fi,j is feature j from paragraph i. This
approach reduces the number of irrelevant features correlated
to the respective security class. Paragraphs’ security classes
are determined independently. The document is labeled with
the highest security class of any it’s paragraphs C(Di) =
maxj C({Pj)}. Thus a document labeled with the security
class S could have paragraphs with any class while a document
Di labeled unclassified must have C({Pj) = U,∀Pj ∈ Di.
B. Classification Probabilities
While adapting a powerful classifier with the appropriate
features is essential for reducing the error rate, there are other
factors that play a critical role in the final outcome such as
class representation and number of classes. Paragraph based
security classification is a special case where a single para-
graph in a document can change the whole document class;
Therefore, understanding paragraph class influence over the
document class would provide clear insight into the difficulty
of paragraph classification process.
Most researchers address the problem of text classification
from the whole document or article point of view. Assuming
a uniform prior over classes, i.e., that all classes are bal-
anced without respect to the classifier’s performance, the prior
probability of a document belonging to one of the classes is
Pr(1) = 1/2. However, for three classes the uniform prior
probability of one document belonging to one of them is
reduced to Pr(1) = 1/3 which gives a clear indication that
in general multi-class classification problems are harder than
the binary single class detection problem.
As for paragraph-based security classification where the
probability of a document belonging to one of the security
levels is solely dependent on its paragraph classes. Considering
the Class set in the previous subsection, a document with
the label U requires all the paragraphs within the document
be labeled as Unclassified, thus the prior probability of a
document belonging to class U is Pr(DU ) = Pr(PU1 )×· · ·×
Pr(PUn ) = (1/3)
n where n is the number of paragraphs in the
document. It is worth noting that the position of the paragraph
does not impact the document class, whereas the probability
of a document belonging to the C class is the probability
of only one paragraph classified as Confidential regardless
of its position and the remaining paragraphs are classified
as either C or U . Pr(DC) = Pr(PCj ) + (Pr(P
C
1 |PU1 ) ×
· · · × Pr(PCn |PUn )) = 1/3 + ((2/3)× · · · × (2/3)). assuming
a uniform prior. Compared to Confidential and Unclassified,
and again – under a uniform prior, documents have higher
probability to be labeled as S because Secret documents can
have paragraphs with any class as long as there is one Secret
paragraph within the document Pr(DS) = PSj = 1/3. Hence,
the more paragraphs there are in the document, the more
feasible it is that the document is labeled as Secret. Also,
note that decreasing the number of security classes would
improve the classification probability, though the probability
calculation presented earlier did not consider two influential
factors: namely, the posterior has little to do with class
frequency and much to do with the classification algorithm,
and that a uniform prior on class frequency does not hold when
classes are unbalanced. Nonetheless, considering the case of a
uniform prior is important for understanding the intuitive dif-
ferences between document-level classification considerations
and paragraph-level considerations.
Even though paragraph-based classification enables infor-
mation access to unclassified or non-sensitive paragraphs
within documents that contains security information, the doc-
uments whole class is totally dependent on the paragraphs’
classes. As formerly stated, a document is labeled with the
highest security class assigned to its paragraphs. In security
text classification, we can build a classifier that is skewed
toward the Secret or Confidential class over the Unclassified
class. By following this method, the number of misclassified
paragraphs as Secret or confidential will also misclassify the
document that originally should be labeled from Unclassified
to Confidential or Secret. If information owners prefer to
implement an access control mechanism based on document
rather than paragraph class, then skewing the classifier to the
highest security level will limit access flexibility.
IV. INSIGHTS INTO WIKILEAKS DATASET
In this section, we provide a description and observations
about the U.S diplomatic cables dataset, dubbed the WikiLeaks
Dataset. The processes taken to reconstruct the dataset are
discussed [1],[9]. Each U.S diplomatic cable consisted of three
sections. The first section is the head section, which includes
some information regarding the sender and the receiver of
the cable, cable security class, reference number and other
information. The creation date of the cable is also included in
the head section. We made sure when we created the dataset
that we preserve the date, origin of the cable in the paragraph
ID. Only the year and month of each cable is added to the
paragraph ID.
In [9], we explained the security classification system uti-
lized in labeling the U.S diplomatic cables. The cable itself has
a label in the head section and its information sections or the
paragraphs are also labeled. The cable label was in full words
such as ”SECRET”, while the paragraph labels were between
brackets in single capital letters such as ”S”. The document
label is one of the entities that paragraph IDs consisted of. In
(a) Impure Topic: This topic is
highly mixed with Secret and Con-
fidential paragraphs.
(b) Impure Topic: This topic is
highly mixed with Unclassified and
Confidential paragraphs.
(c) Pure Topic: This topic is pop-
ulated mostly by Confidential para-
graphs.
Fig. 2: Examples of topic purity based on Berlin thresholds [9]
addition to that, we kept the cable number and the paragraph
position in the cable in the paragraph ID. The second section
was the subject, and finally the third one was the body of
the cable itself which included one more information sections
which we also call a paragraph.
The embassies: Baghdad, London, Berlin and Damascus
were chosen randomly from many other embassies. However,
dataset corresponding to the Baghdad embassy had, by far, the
largest number of cables. The total number of instances in a
single dataset can be up to 50,000 paragraphs. Some cables
especially the UNCLASSIFIED ones, are used as templates
for daily reports, therefore, many features are shared among
them.
V. METHODOLOGIES
In this section, we will briefly outline the Topic Model
Pruning algorithm and describe in detail the new partitioned
version of ACESS.
A. Topic Models Pruning
The topic model pruning algorithm is described in [9]. In
short, the approach locates and removes impure topics by
examining the purity of main topics and subtopics generated
from the training set. The purity threshold lower and upper
values are selected based on the classes percentages in the
training set. In Fig. 2, three graphs illustrate topic purity
examples based on the Berlin thresholds. The topic is con-
sidered impure if the two of the closest class’s percentages
(SECRET & CONF or UNCLAS & CONF) within the topic
fall between the predefined thresholds’ lower and upper values
with respect to the class. The security classification levels
are hierarchical, which means Secret is more sensitive than
Confidential and Confidential is more sensitive than Unclas-
sified. Since Confidential is between Unclassified and Secret
in the sensitivity hierarchy, we would expect this to be the
class of highest confusion. Therefore, we did not examine
Unclassified and Secret class purities – only Confidential.
Topics are generated twice, the purpose of the first run is
to extract the main topics. Instances that belonged to the
two conditioned classes are extracted and retain the class’s
instances which are not conditioned. The second run is to
extract the subtopics from all the extracted instances. The same
purity conditioning is applied and this time, and the instances
are permanently removed.
B. Automated Security Classification Enabled By Similarity
(Partitions Version)
In the ACESS paper [1], we generated a wide range of
clusters and built a classification model based on each of
these clusters. The intuition behind this was to find the group
of classification models with the best results via a cross-
validation technique. Looking back at the results from that
experiment we found that that, up to a point, the F-Measure
results improved as we increased clusters, then they declined.
This experiment itself took a very long time to perform,
due to the large number of clusters and classifiers that were
built. Therefore, our methodology in this paper only generates
clusters once for each dataset, and then builds the classification
models based on that set of clusters. Still, the optimal number
of clusters is not known; therefore, we use a number of clusters
proportionate to the number of instances in training set. Also,
number of features that we have selected to use this time is
different than before. In the original version of ACESS, we
selected small set of similarity features to make sure that the
clusters were populated with paragraphs with different classes.
In this version, the number instances and class representation
does not matter. A larger set of similarity features is selected
and hence fewer paragraphs can populate the clusters. This
can also be viewed as a cleansing process where an outlier
or a single paragraph is assigned to a single cluster by itself.
Similar to the older version of ACESS, we used a unigram
feature to generate clusters. The following is an illustration of
the steps taken in ACESS the partition version:
1) Group of Similarity Clusters: The first step is to generate
clusters from the training paragraphs. To do so, we first
tokenize the paragraphs and extract similarity features from
the training set. The features with highest TF-IDF values are
selected as similarity features. The number of features may
vary depending on the number of feature values. We do not
apply any normalization, we remove stop words and do not
perform stemming. The number of clusters that we select
corresponds to the number of training paragraphs divided
by a default value of 200. We expect that optimizing this
hyperparameter over the validation set can yield better results.
Fig. 3: This figure does not show the intermediate pre-processing procedures. First, similarity clusters are generated out of the training
set. Clusters models are utilized to assign both validation and testing set paragraphs to one of the training set clusters. The paragraphs for
training, validation and testing clusters are kept in separate files.
Fig. 4: The classification models are built over cluster obtained from
the training set. For each training cluster, optimal classification model
hyperparameters are selected according to the points in the validation
set that are closest to that corresponding cluster. The performance
of this classification model is evaluated for its corresponding points
in the test set.
The same pre-processing procedures are reapplied on the
validation and testing sets. The clustering model built upon
the training set is utilized to assign both validation and testing
paragraphs to one of the training clusters. However, each
cluster-set is collected separately. Note that since validation
and testing points are assigned to the cluster of nearest training
data, some clusters will not be used during validation and
testing.
2) Group of Classification Models: The number of clas-
sification models generated for each dataset is the same as
the number of training clusters, with one classifier per cluster.
Classifier parameters are tuned on the validation set. The same
set of security features is selected and examined against the
validation set (cf. Fig 4). Similar to the clustering process,
paragraphs are tokenized, but document frequency is used
to value the extracted features, Not TF-IDF. Only unigram
of alphabetic features is considered. Finally, the classifier is
retrained with best set of parameters and the results obtained
from predicting testing paragraphs are reported.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Metric
Depending on the nature of the organization, the damage
resulting from leaking sensitive information might be more
significant than interrupting services or restricting eligible
users from accessing non-sensitive information. In this case,
detecting sensitive paragraphs must be prioritized over service
convenience. However, this paper assumes that all security
classes are equally important, to balance between risk and
convenience. Therefore, we use F1-score over precision and
recall as a performance measure to compare between different
prediction models. We report F1-Measure per class – the
harmonic mean of precision and recall. Where TP , FP , and
FN are the number of true positives, false positives, and false
negatives respectively, this measure is defined as
F1-Measure = 2×TP2×TP+FP+FN .
B. Baseline
The baseline models that we compare to in this paper are
Linear-SVMs, Naive Bayes, and Logistic Regression without
a pruned dataset. We compare our ACESS model and Logistic
Regression with pruning, which outperformed our baseline
classifiers in previous work, [1], we also attempted using
kernel SVMs, but found that there was little gain over linear,
perhaps due to the already sparse feature space. We selected
hyperparameters for these classifiers via a grid-search on the
validation set, using a TF-IDF feature space, optimized with
respect to the maximum number of features to keep and
normalization method. The feature space optimization was also
performed via a grid search. For the pruned data, multi-class
classification one-vs-one Logistic Regression with a CG solver
was used. The TF-IDF feature space was similarly optimized
via a grid search over the validation set. We retrained the
classifier using the best feature space and report our results
on the test set. Classes were re-weighted to reflect their actual
sizes in the new training set. The partitioned version of ACESS
Fig. 5: This figure displays the results obtained from running the baseline algorithms, Logistic Regression with pruning and ACESS. ACESS
outperformed all the baseline algorithms and Logistic Regression on the pruned data. The lowest F1-Measure achieved across all the classes
is over 0.5, therefore, the y axis starts from 0.5. S, C, and U are initials for Secret, Confidential and Unclassified.
used a Linear-SVM with grid search over the validation set to
obtain each separate C parameter and document frequency
vectorization. The top thousand features with with highest
frequency were selected. Note that the real number of selected
features is greater than a thousand because the feature with
least frequency equals to other features with same frequency.
The security features are both unigrams and bigrams.
C. Clustering Setup
TABLE I: Statistics for the clustering step.
Dataset # clusters # features
Baghdad 200 1360
London 24 1645
Berlin 38 1577
Damascus 33 1549
Unlike the experiment in the ACESS paper, one set of
clusters is constructed. The table I displays number of clusters
for each dataset. In the similarity clustering step, the top thou-
sand features with highest TF-IDF were selected, note that the
real number of features is larger than 1000, because multiple
features equal the lowest TF-IDF value. The exact number of
selected features is in table I. Finally, the initialization for the
K-means clustering was random.
D. Results
Fig. 5 displays respective classification results on each re-
spective dataset. We see that the partitioned version of ACESS
outperforms all other baseline algorithms as does Logistic
Regression on pruned data. However, ACESS outperforms our
pruned version of Logistic Regression.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that ACESS outper-
forms topic model pruning as well as other baselines. This
evaluation demonstrates how well respective classification
models work for sensitive text detection over several real-
world sensitive text datasets and gives us intuition about
what constitutes a good model. ACESS and our topic model
pruning approaches are fundamentally different; perhaps we
can extend this work by fusing concepts from each approach.
Much additional future work can also involve components of
the algorithms/data acquisition that are not directly related to
the classifier, including gathering additional datasets, e.g., with
other leaked Wikileaks data from the same source or others
(e.g., Panama papers), and using a better feature space repre-
sentation, e.g., a deep neural network vectorization algorithm
like Word2Vec.
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